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JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT
Plaintiff-Appellee

adopt

the

jurisdictional

statement in

Defendants-Appellants' brief.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
Plaintiff-Appellee

adopt

the

standard

of

review

in

Defendants-Appellants' brief.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Prior

to,

and

at

the

time

of

the

defamatory

publications complained of, the plaintiff-appefri^nt Terry West
was elected Mayor of LaVerkin, Utah.
raspondent,

The

Daily

Spectrum

At such time the defendant-

was,

and

still

is

a daily

newspaper doing business in several counties in the State of
Utah, and at such time the defendant-respondent Don Hogun was,
and still is, the publisher/general manager of The Daily Spectrum
with the authority to determine what news articles might appear
or be withheld from publication, and has the responsibility to
oversee whatever goes on in the newspaper.
and 17 .20-24)

(dep. Hogun 5 3-13

And at such time the defendant-resqaeadeat Goodey

was, the managing editor of The Daily Spectrum, and had the
authority to determine what news articles might appear or be
withheld from publication and was directly responsible for giving
the reporters assignments and direction.
25)

(dep. Hogun 10 25 to 11

And at such time the defendant Rick Guldan was, a reporter

for The Daily Spectrum. (Third Amended Complaint R 224 at #9)
At the time of the November 3, 1988 election, when the
plaintiff-app^y^Ht Terry West was elected as Mayor of LaVerkin
1

City, there was a controversy in the city over municipal power.
The issue of municipal power was very much a political issue and
many votes were cast just on the position the candidate was
taking on the issue. (Third Amended Complaint R 224 #10)
On June 27, 1988, and July 2, 1988, the defendantsrespondents, published or caused to be published, two of the
three articles complained of. (Brief of Appellants Appendix D &
G)

Judge Eves found, among other things, that the statements in

the two articles relating to the plaintiff's change of position
on

the

municipal

power

issue

were

defamatory

since

it's

connotation was that the plaintiff-ap~p©l±»nt espoused opposition
to municipal power to get elected. (R 353-354)

However, Judge

Eves granted to the defendants and against the plaintiff that
portion of the Summary Judgment^ relating to the cause of action
in each of the two articles therein Plaintiff is alleged to have
changed his position regarding the issue of municipal power,
because

he

found

that

those

statements

are

constitutionally

protected expressions of opinion, (R 3 60) and that they do not
contain a provable false factual connotation. (R 421)

The court

also held that plaintiff-appellee failed to marshall sufficient
evidence to prove "actual malice" against defendants Hogun and
Goodey. (R 366 and 268)

The defendants Rick Guldan and Thomson

Newspaper were left as parties to the first cause of action as to
the statements concerning the insurance claim filed by plaintiffappellee Terry West. (R 374)
On November 20, 1988, all the defendants-appellants, except
2

Rick Guldan, published or caused to be published, another article
alleging that the Plaintiff-Appellee had repeatedly attempted to
manipulate the press,

(defendants-appellant

brief Appendix H)

However, Judge Eves dismissed all defendants-appellants, from the
third cause of action, holding, that the statement accusing the
plaintiff-appellee of attempting to manipulate the press, could
not in the minds of any reasonable jury be found defamatory under
Utah Law. (R 102).
The Plaintiff-Appellee appealed the trial court holdings to
the Utah Court of Appeals.

The majority opinion of the Court of

Appeals held (a) that the statements by columnist Guldan inferred
that the mayor opposed municipal power to get elected; (West, 835
P.2d at 183-87) and (b) that the statements contained a provable
factual

connotation

and

therefore, were

not

constitutionally

protected opinion under the U.S. Constitution; id., and (c) that
summary judgment for publisher Hogun and editor Goodey was proper
with respect to the June column, but improper with respect to the
July column, because the plaintiff had marshalled enough evidence
of actual malice on the part of Hogun and Goodey to create a
question of fact for the jury
Goodey,s

accusation

in

the

(id. at 187-89) ; and (d) that

November

column

that

the

Mayor

repeatedly attempted to manipulate the press was susceptible of a
defamatory meaning under Utah law and thus created a jury issue,
(id. at 189-90)
STATEMENT OF MATERIAL FACTS
Plaintiff-Appellee adopt the statement of material facts
3

as set forth in paragraphs 1-29 on pages 6-13 of DefendantsAppellants' brief and object to paragraph 8 and 28 which are
contested issues of fact.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
P O I N T
I.
THE STATEMENTS AT ISSUE ARE NOT CQNSTTTUTTONAT.T.V
PROTECTED EXPRESSIONS OF OPINION UNDER THE FIRST AMENDMENT.
In the June article, the Defendant Guldan wrote,
" . . . Terry West, when running for mayor, was opposed to it
(municipal power).
However, the first thing West did as
mayor was . . . . reactivated the municipal power issue.
(Defendants' brief Appendix "D")"
The trial

court

found

that these statements were defamatory

because,
"This allegation of a change in position was made
following a hotly contested election in a small
community where candidates lost or won depending upon
their announced position regarding municipal power."
(R. 343)
and under these circumstances that the statements inferred that
the Plaintiff had espoused opposition to municipal power to get
elected and then immediately pursued a pro-municipal power agenda
as Mayor, and
" [t]o suggest that those who trusted such a man and voted
for him because of his announced intentions would not,
following his change of heart, have at least contempt for
him borders on the ridiculous." (R. 353-54)
The implied factual assertion that West opposed municipal power
to get elected and then immediately pursued a pro-municipal power
agenda

as mayor

therefore,

the

is capable
statements

of

of being proven
the defendant

true or false,
Guldan

constitutionally protected expressions of opinion.

Milkovich v.

Lorain Journal Co., 491 U.S. 1, 110 S.Ct 2695 (1990).
4

were not

P O I N T
II,
WHETHER OR NOT THE UTAH COURT OF APPFAT.S
CONSIDERED THE UTAH STATE CONSTITUTIONAL ARGUMENT THAT THE
STATEMENTS AT ISSUE WERE CONSTITUTIONALLY PROTECTED EXPRESSIONS
OF OPINION UNDER ARTICLE I, SECTION 15 OF THE UTAH CONSTITUTION
IS IMMATERIAL BECAUSE, EVEN IF THEY HAD, IT WOULDN'T HAVE ALTERED
THE RESULTS OF THE APPEAL,
Defendants, joined by amicus curiae SPJ, urged the court to
adopt an opinion privilege under Article I, Section 15 of the
Utah State Constitution.

However, it appeared to the Utah Court

of Appeals, from a review of the record, that Defendants did not
raise this state constitutional argument below, and that the
Court generally will not consider an issue, even a constitutional
one, which the defendant raises on appeal for the first time.
Whether or not the Court erred in not addressing the Utah
State Constitutional argument concerning the statements in issue
seems immaterial, since the Defendant Guldan had already said,
that his remarks were made in a singularly unopinionated format
and all that he had done, was to present the facts
available

to

him,

and

left

any

conclusions

which were

to the reader.

(Defendants brief Appendix "G")
P O I N T
III, EVEN IF THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS HAD ACCEPTED
THE FEDERAL CIVIL PROCEDURE REQUIREMENT THAT A LIBEL PLAINTIFF
PRODUCE "CLEAR AND CONVINCING" EVIDENCE THAT THE DEFENDANTS ACTED
WITH ACTUAL MALICE AS LAID DOWN BY THE ANDERSON CASE, IT WOULDN'T
HAVE ALTERED THE RESULTS OF THE APPEAL,
The Utah Court of Appeals refused to be the first court in
the state, to commit the State of Utah, to adopt the federal
civil procedure requirement that a libel plaintiff on a motion
for summary judgment produce "clear and convincing" evidence that
the defendants acted with actual malice.
Lobby. Inc.. 477 U.S. 242 (1986).
5

See Anderson v Liberty

However, the Court made it

very clear that if it had accepted Anderson. it would not have
altered the result of the appeal, because such a standard of
clear and convincing evidence had been met by the Plaintiffs.
See West, at 189 n.ll.
ARGUMENTS
P O I N T
I. THE STATEMENTS AT ISSUE ARE NOT CONSTITUTIONALLY
PROTECTED EXPRESSIONS OF OPINION UNDER THE FIRST AMENDMENT.
A statement is not constitutionally protected expressions of
opinion if it contain a "provable false factual connotation."
Milkovich v. Lorain Journal

Co., 491 U.S. 1, 110 S.Ct 2695

(1990).
The trial court found that the following statements, as
printed

in

an

article

written

by

Defendant

Guldan,

are

defamatory:
" . . . Terry West, when running for mayor, was opposed to
it. (municipal power). However, the first thing West did as
mayor was . . . [he] reactivated the municipal power issue.
(Article dated June 27, 1988, Defendants brief Appendix
»D") "
"I said Mayor West had been opposed to municipal power
during the election.
The mayor claims he never took that
position.
Several LaVerkin citizens however have told me
that prior to the election they were under the impression
West was opposed to municipal power, which is why they voted
for him."
(Follow-up article dated July 2, 1988,
Defendants7 brief Appendix "G")
Defendants-Appellants and the amicus curiae SPJ contend that
the statements in the two articles relating to the plaintiff's
change

of

position

on

actionable, because

the

essence, they

the

municipal

statements

power

are not

issue

are

defamatory.

not
In

argue that politicians frequently change their

positions on issues and that accusing a public official of such a
6

change, even if false, does not injure the reputation of the
public official.

The trial court said the following in answer to

this argument:
"Of course, to determine whether or not the statement
is defamatory one must consider the statement and its
meaning in the context in which the statement was made and
not in a vacuum. This allegation of a change of position
was made following a hotly contested election in a small
community where candidates lost or won depending upon their
announced position regarding municipal power. The voters
had, prior to the election, expressed their opposition to
the acquisition of a power distribution system by the City
of LaVerkin.
The voters were therefore likely to elect
those whose shared the opposition espoused by the majority."
(R. 353) (emphases added)
In Judge Eves' Memorandum Opinion dated October 17, 1990,
relying on the Milkovich case, the court correctly presented the
issue in question as follows:
"In this case the question is simply whether the statements
of the defendants regarding the plaintiff's position on
municipal power contain a provable false factual connotation." (R 421) (emphasis added)
The trial court correctly found that the statements complained of
clearly

inferred

that

the

Plaintiff

espoused

opposition

to

municipal power to get elected and then immediately pursued a
pro-municipal power agenda as mayor, because as the court said:
To suggest that those who trusted such a man and voted for
him because of his announced intentions would not, following
his change of heart, have at least contempt for him borders
on the ridiculous." (R. 354) (emphasis added)
After finding that the statements were defamatory, the court
found

that

the

connotation

that the plaintiff

had

espoused

opposition to municipal power to get elected, was impossible to
prove,

and

therefore, the

constitutional protection.

connotation was
The court held,
7

entitled

to full

"Specifically, this Court finds that it would be impossible
for anyone to prove, given the facts before the Court in
this case, what the precise position . . . the mayor (held)
on the issue of municipal power prior to the election. The
only person who would have all of the facts necessary to
prove that issue would be the Mayor himself. (R 421)
(emphasis added)
It is specifically this finding wherein the plaintiff claims the
trial court erred in analyzing the issues which was before it.
The issue isn't, and never was, what the,
"precise position the mayor (held) on the issue of municipal
power prior to the election."
The issue is and always has been whether or not the plaintiff,
publicly

espoused

opposition

to

municipal

power

during

the

election to get elected and then immediately pursued a promunicipal power agenda as Mayor of the city. (See Memorandum
Opinion dated July 25, 1988, Defendants brief Appendix "C" R.
354)
The Utah Court of Appeals also recognized that the trial
court erred on this issue,
". . . I n applying the Milkovich test to the present case,
we must determine whether the connotation that West opposed
municipal power in order to be elected was sufficiently
factual to be susceptible of being proven false. . . . The
trial court erroneously reasoned that since only West could
truly know his position before the election, Guldan's report
of his change in position could not be proven true or false.
The trial court failed to recognize that it is West's public
position, not his private view, that is at issue. . . "
(West, at 186) (emphasis added)
In the opinion of the trial court, the Milkovich decision
stands

for

the

proposition

that

there

must

be

independent

objective proof that the "factual connotation" is false, before
the matter may be submitted to a trier of fact, i.d.. objective
8

proof that the Plaintiff did not espouse opposition to municipal
power during the election to get elected and then immediately
pursued a pro-municipal power agenda as mayor.

(R. 421-422)

The Plaintiff contents that the "letters to the citizens"
(R. 349 Appendix 7) are independent objective proof that he did
not espouse opposition to municipal power prior to the election.
However, the trial court found different, it said:
"This Court has reviewed the "letters to citizens" which
plaintiff [claims] demonstrate his pre-election position.
These letters appear ambiguous and unenlightening to this
Court. . . " (R. 365)
The Utah Court of Appeals said the following concerning
whether or not the "letters to the citizens" are

"objective

proof" that the Plaintiff did not espouse opposition to municipal
power prior to the election to get elected:
. . . The trial court ruled that the letter was insufficient
to raise a question as to whether West in fact opposed
municipal power before the election. Such a conclusion was
incorrect.
The letter clearly indicates that West was
taking a pro-municipal power position before the election.
The letter therefore creates a material question of fact as
to West's pre-election position.
We conclude that the trial court erred in ruling that
the connotations of Guldan's comments were not factual
enough to be susceptible of being proven as true or false.
Either West did, or he did not, publicly oppose municipal
power prior to the election. If he did not oppose municipal
power, then it cannot truthfully be said that he opposed it
for political gain.
If a jury finds that West publicly
opposed municipal power prior to the election, West will
have failed to prove that the statements were in fact false
and his libel claim will fail. If, on the other hand, a
jury concludes that West publicly and consistently supported
municipal power prior to the election, then any connotation
in Guldan's articles that he opposed municipal power in
order to get elected would, as a matter of logic, be proven
false." West v. Thomson Newspaper, 835 P.2d 179 at 186.
(emphases added)
9

Since the Court of Appeal found that it is possible for the
factual connotation of Guldan's articles to be proven false,

i.e.

that the Plaintiff espoused opposition to municipal power during
the election to get elected and then immediately pursued a promunicipal power agenda.

The Utah Court of Appeals held that

Guldan's statements in his articles concerning West's change of
position are actionable." id.
P O I N T
II, WHETHER OR NOT THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
CONSIDERED THE UTAH STATE CONSTITUTIONAL ARGUMENT THAT THE
STATEMENTS AT ISSUE WERE CONSTITUTIONALLY PROTECTED EXPRESSIONS
OF OPINION UNDER ARTICLE I. SECTION 15 OF THE UTAH CONSTITUTION
IS IMMATERIAL BECAUSE EVEN IF THEY HAD. IT WOULDN'T HAVE ALTERED
THE RESULTS OF THE APPEAL.
The Utah Court of Appeals did not take into consideration
the

Defendants-Appellants7

Second

Affirmative

Defense

to

plaintiff's complaint, because it appeared to the Court from
review of the record, that Defendants-Appellants did not raise
this state constitutional argument below, West, at 184 n.5. and
because of Guldan's portrayal in his second article that the
statements in his first article were "facts which were available
to him" and that he "left any conclusions to the reader."

(id.

at 186 n.7.)
If the Utah Constitutional argument was made before the
trial court as the Defendants-Appellants claim in their brief,
the constitutional argument must have been made in a passing
remark since the trial court had three chances to refer to such
an argument in it's three Memorandum Opinions which were appealed
to the Utah Court of Appeals.

In reviewing the three Memorandum

Opinions made by the trial court there is no mention of a Utah
10

State constitutional argument in any of them.

(See Defendants'

brief Appendix "C")
The

only

time

the

Defendants-Appellants

made

the

Utah

constitutional argument was after the Milkovich case came down,
and their argument was based on Immuno A.G. v. Moor-Jankowski. 18
Med.

L.

Rptr.

1625,

a New

York

1991

case which

discussed

Milkovich in relation to the New York State Constitution.

Both

cases came after June 7, 1990, when Defendant's Motion to Dismiss
was argued.

In Defendant's brief to the Utah Court of Appeals,

the Utah constitution argument comprised a large part of their
brief, however, this was the first brief or memorandum in which
this argument was made.
If the Supreme Court of Utah ever did want to address the
issue of what protection, if &ny, is independently afforded to
expressions of opinion under Utah's constitution, the Court would
not

pick

the West

case

to make this determination

for the

following two reasons:
1.

If there was any doubt or confusion with the readers of

Guldan's June
statements

27, 1988, article,

made

in

that

article

as to whether or not the
were

opinion

or

fact, the

reporter-defendant Rick Guldan, took any doubt or confusion away
when he made the following statement in his July 2, 1988, followup article.
In my last column, I addressed, areas of concern I had
about the Mayor's actions. I believe I addressed them in a
singularly unopinionated format.
All I have done is
presented the facts which were available to me, and left any
conclusions to the reader.
(See Defendants brief Appendix
"G")
11

The Utah Court of Appeals recognized this fact when it said
the following:
"The trial court ruled that Guldan's comments were his
"interpretation" of the pre-election position of the Mayor
and were therefore "opinion." Such a conclusion is directly
contrary to Guldan's own portrayal in his second article of
his earlier statements. West at 186 n.7.
For a Court to conclude under these circumstances that the
statements complained of were protected as "opinion" under the
Utah constitution, such a conclusion would be directly contrary
to Guldan's own portrayal of his earlier statements.
2.
"falsity"

If

a

of

plaintiff

a

challenged

in

a

defamation

statement

and

suit
can

proves

the

"affirmatively

produce evidence" upon which a reasonable jury could find by
Mclear and convincing" evidence that a media defendant acted with
"actual malice," the Utah Supreme Court should not find that the
Utah State Constitution protects such challenged speech made by a
reporter knowing that it was false or with reckless disregard
whether if was true or false.
law

rule

malice."

of

"fair comment11 requires the absence of "actual

Also the State of Utah's retracjtion statute, 45-2-1

U.C.A.,

which

requires

that

faith."

Even the State of Utah's common

protected
the

newspapers

challenged

from

punitive

damages,

statements were made

in "good

Why would any State, let alone the State of Utah, want

to protect a defamatory statement made with "actual malice," i.e.
knowing it was false or with reckless disregard whether it was
true or

false, from an action in defamation because it was

"couched" in an arguably opinion formate and particularly when
12

such defamatory

statement contains a "provable false factual

connotation?"
Therefore, for the reasons set forth herein, the Utah Court
of Appeals was correct in refusing to consider the issue of
whether the Utah constitution affords greater protection to the
press in the area of protected opinion than does the federal
constitution.
P O I N T
III. EVEN IF THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS HAD ACCEPTED
THE FEDERAL CIVIL PROCEDURE REQUIREMENT THAT A LIBEL PLAINTIFF
PRODUCE "CLEAR AND CONVINCING" EVIDENCE THAT THE DEFENDANTS ACTED
WITH ACTUAL MALICE AS LAID DOWN BY THE ANDERSON CASE. IT WOULDN'T
HAVE ALTERED THE RESULTS OF THE APPEAL.
The court in Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, supra held that
there is no genuine issue if the evidence brought forward in the
opposing affidavits is "of insufficient caliber or quantity to
allow a rational finder of fact to find actual malice by clear
and convincing evidence."

Id. at 2513.

The Anderson court said

that its holding was not meant to denigrate the role of the jury,
or authorize trial on affidavits.

Id.

The evidence of the non-movement is to be believed, and all
justifiable inferences are to be drawn in his favor, and the
moving party must foreclose [] the possibility of the existence
of certain facts from which the jury could infer actual malice,
and credibility determination, the weighing of evidence, and the
drawing of legitimate inferences remain the functions of the
jury, not the judge on a summary judgment motion.

Id.

at 2510

and 2513

(citing Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144

(1970)).

The Court further seemed to admonish the trial judges
13

to err on the side of denying summary judgment "where there is
reason to believe that the better course would be to proceed to a
full trial."

Anderson at 106 S.Ct. at .2514 (citing Kennedy v.

Silas Mason Co.. 334 U.S. 249 (1948)).
The court in West, at 189 n.ll, declined to follow the
Anderson case as a matter of civil procedure.

Whether or not the

Supreme Court of Utah wants to adopt the federal civil procedure
requirement that a libel plaintiff produce "clear and convincing"
evidence that the defendants acted with actual malice as set
forth in the Anderson case, does not matter in the instant case
because there was sufficient

"clear and convincing" evidence

before the Utah Court of Appeals to find a jury issue as to
actual malice.
The Utah

Court

of Appeals also thought that there was

sufficient clear and convincing evidence from which a jury might
return a verdict in the plaintiff's favor.

The Court said the

following concerning this subject on page 189 n.ll of the West
case:
"Even if we were to adopt the federal approach set forth in
Anderson, it would not alter the result of this appeal. As
the Supreme Court itself said, "[t]he evidence of the nonmovement is to be believed, and all justifiable inferences
are to be drown in his favor,." Anderson, 477 U.S. at 255,
106 S.Ct. at 2513, and "the plaintiff to survive the
defendant's motion, need only present evidence from which a
jury might return a verdict in his favor. If he does so,
there is a genuine issue of fact that requires a trial."
Id. at 257, 106 S.Ct. at 2514 (emphasis added). Such a
standard has been met here."
The Defendants-Appellants said the following on page 29 of
their brief:
14

. • . "Rather, the majority held that Hogun and Goodey were
not entitled to summary judgment because the Mayor came
forward with sufficient evidence to demonstrate the
"possibility" that a jury could find that they acted with
actual malice.
Id. at 188-89. This view denigrates the
proper role of the trial court in an actual malice case and
is both constitutionally and procedurally
infirm."
(emphasis added by plaintiff)
The Defendants should read the Anderson case more carefully.

The

Utah Court of Appeals made it clear that it was following the
Anderson

case

"possibility."

when

it

was

using

the words

"foreclose" and

The Court of Appeals said,

Hogun's assertion that the foregoing facts demand
summary judgment is erroneous.
While they might be
persuasive to a jury, they do not support a motion for
summary judgment because they do not foreclose the
possibility that a jury might find actual malice.
See
Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, 477 U.S. 242, 249, 106 S.Ct.
2505, 2510, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986) (citing Adickes v. S.H.
Kress & Co.. 398 U.S. 144 (1970) (moving party must
"foreclose [] the possibility of the existence of certain
facts " from which the jury could infer a conspiracy) .
West, at 188. (emphases in original)

Viewing the accumulation of circumstantial evidence and
the possible inferences in favor of West, we conclude that
Hogun and Goodey were not entitled to summary judgment as a
matter of law.
Hogun and Goodey did not foreclose the
possibility of a jury finding that they acted with actual
malice.
They presented evidence which could support a
jury's finding in their favor, but the evidence does not
mandate such a finding.
. . . West at 189.
(emphases
added)
The attorney for Defendants-Appellants wanted the Utah Court
of Appeals to adopt the holding in the Anderson case that "clear
and convincing" evidence is needed for a public figure to prevail
at a summary judgment hearing in a libel suit, without also
accepting that the Anderson case stands for the proposition that
"the plaintiff, to survive the defendant's motion, need only
15

present evidence from which a jury might return a verdict in his
favor.

If he does so, there is a genuine issue of fact that

requires a trial."

Id.

(emphasis in original).

477 U.S. at.257, 106 S.Ct. at 2514
The Utah Court of Appeals in discussing

the West case in relationship with the Anderson holding said,
"such a standard has been met here."

See West, at 189 n.ll.

The Defendants do not want to accept the Court of Appeals
finding that their evidence presented at the motion for summary
judgment did not "foreclose" the "possibility" of a jury finding
that they acted with actual malice.

See Anderson at 477 U.S. at

249, 106 S.Ct. at 1510; see West, at 188.
At

the

trial

court's

hearing

on defendants7

Motion to

.Dismiss, the Plaintiff-Appellee did marshall sufficient evidence
on "actual malice" on the part of Hogun and Goodey to meet the
"clear and convincing" standard of fault to have allowed the
issue of "actual malice" to go to the jury.
The -record will show that neither Hogun or Goodey made any
inquiries or verification about the statements complained of, or
have someone else verify any information, prior to publication of
the July 2, 1988, follow-up article (Hogun Affidavit R. 325 #14
and

Goodey

Affidavit

33 3

#18)

even

after

they

were

given

information that would have given them serious doubts as to the
correctness

of

their

June

27,

1988,

article.

(Terry

West

Affidavit R 349 exhibit 1) (R 349 exhibit 6, reply letter to the
June 27, 1988 article)

After the June article was published

their

them

attorney

advised

that
16

they

need

not

make

any

corrections

or

retractions

other

than

the

correction

and

retraction concerning the insurance issue, stating that it was
his opinion that the additional statements complained of were the
defendant Guldan's opinions to which a further retraction or
clarification was not necessary nor appropriate, (R 325, 333)

In

their discussion with their attorney, the defendants' affidavits
show

that

the

issue

as

to

whether

or

not

the

statements

complained of were true or false was ignored by both the attorney
and defendants.

(see defendant's

affidavits R

322-335)

The

inference is that the Defendants were more worried about whether
the

statements

were

actionable,

than

whether

or

not

the

statements were true or false.
Hogun allowed a follow-up article to be printed on July 2,
1988, however, he claims he did not review the article, (R.28283) the inference is that he did not do so in an effort to
protect himself from suit.
The July
flying.

article was written

in the face of red flags

To say that the defendants did not entertain "serious

doubts" with red flags flying, at the time the follow-up article
was printed, would take us into "make believe land."
of the actual malice inquiry

The focus

is on the defendant's attitude

toward the truth or falsity of the publication, on his subjective
awareness of its probable falsity, and on his actual doubts as to
its accuracy, (not on what their attorney advised them or whether
the statements were actionable)
N.J. 451, 467-68 (1982)

Lawrence v. Bauer Publishing, 89

See also Carson v. Allied News Co., 529
17

F.2d 206, 209 (7th Cir. 1976) (actual malice concentrates on the
defendants' attitude toward the truth or falsity of the material
published) (not on what their attorney advised them or whether or
not the statements were actionable)
In Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union of United States, 692 F.2d
189, 196 (1st Cir. 1982) aff'd 104 S.Ct. 1949, 80 L.Ed.2d 502
(1984) the court said,
The subjective determination of whether a (defendant) in
fact entertained serious doubts as to the truth of the
statement may be proved by inference, as it would be rare
for a defendant to admit such doubts . . . .
A court
typically will infer actual malice from objective facts . .
These facts should provide evidence of negligence,
motive, and intent such that an accumulation of the evidence
and appropriate inferences supports the existence of actual
malice. (emphasis added)
The accumulation of objective facts that will support the
finding of actual malice in the case at hand are found in POINT
III #1 thru #8 below.

However you will

find each of the

following categories of evidence standing alone is sufficient
evidence to support "actual malice".
1.

Appearance of new reasons to doubt coupled with no new
investigation as evidence of actual malice. See POINT
III (2) below.

2.

Reliability of sources.

See POINT III (3) below.

The Defendants-Appellants must remember what the court said
in Tavoulareas v. Piro, 759 F.2d 90, 116 (1985), wherein it said,
The issue is not whether the memorandum alone proves clearly
and convincingly that the article was published with actual
malice, it is whether it is evidence that, taken in conjunction with other evidence, tends to prove that fact clearly
and convincingly.
Therefore, the issue in the present case is not whether each
18

of the evidences listed in POINT III of this brief will alone
prove clearly and convincingly that the defendants published with
actual malice, it is whether each is evidence that, taken in
conjunction with other evidence, tends to prove clearly and
convincingly that the defendants acted with actual malice.
The

plaintiff

circumstantial

here

evidence

will

and

attempt

justifiable

to

demonstrate

inferences

that

by
the

Defendants-Appellants Hogun and Goodey acted with actual malice.
Each of the major categories of evidence of "actual malice"
will be discussed in turn, though their order of appearance is
not meant to reflect their relative importance.
1. SUPPRESSION OF INFORMATION
FAVORABLE TO THE PLAINTIFF
AS EVIDENCE OF ACTUAL MALICE
JULY 2. 1988 ARTICLE
Each defendant had strong, if not conclusive evidence in
their possession that the connotation that the plaintiff had
opposed municipal power during the election to get elected, and
immediately changed his position after the election was false.
(Letters to Citizens R. 349 exhibit 7)
deliberately

suppressed

All three Defendants

these letters during the writing and

editing of the follow-up story in order to strengthen their case
against the plaintiff.

The inference is that their failure to

cause plaintiff's pre-election

letter to the citizens to be

mentioned in the follow-up article was a deliberate attempt to
avoid any indication that the initial article was erroneous.
The Court in

Tavoulareas v. Piro supra, said at 125,

"Unquestionably, a writer (or editor) of an article who
19

knowingly suppresses the facts that would prove its falsity
is more likely to have doubts about the accuracy of his
defamatory story than one who either has no such knowledge
or has endeavored to present the facts fairly. The writer
who suppresses favorable facts is more likely to suspect
that his version is not substantially true. Hence courts
have held repeatedly that the choices of which facts to
report is relevant to the question of actual malice. . . .
The editorial process by which the defendants selected which
facts they would print, and which they would suppress, was a
factor the jury could take into account in reaching its
conclusion as to actual malice."
Tavoulareas v. Piro, 759 F2d 90, (D.C. Cir. 1985, three-judge
panel) was vacated

by

en bano

order

Tavoulareas v. Piro. 817 F.2d 762

of the

full court in

(D.C. 1987), however, this

category of "actual malice" was not rejected in the latter case.
EVIDENCE OF
ACTUAL MALICE
The

defendant

Don

Hogun

was

given

the

letters

to the

citizens (Letters to Citizens XR 349 exhibit 7) by the plaintiffappellant prior to the publishing of the July 2, 1988, follow-up
article, and he read them in the presence of the plaintiffrespondent, (dep. Hogun 40 21 to 42 3) (Terry West affidavit R
349 exhibit 1 #5) yet he did not make sure that the letters were
used in the follow-up article of July 2, 1988, even though he
promised he would give them to the defendants Rick Guldan and
Brent Goodey for verification,

(id. at #5)

He also testified

that he had no reason to think that the letters were not sent to
all the citizens. (Dep. Hogun 45 9-11)
The Defendant Hogun testified that.he gave the "letters to
the citizens" to the defendant Brent Goodey. (dep. Hogun 62 512)

Therefore, when the defendant
20

Brent

Goodey

edited the

follow-up article of July 2, 1988, he knew that this evidence
would have discredited the paper's position if he had included
the "letters to the citizens" in the follow-up article.
2.

APPEARANCE OF NEW REASONS TO DOUBT
COUPLED WITH NO NEW INVESTIGATION
AS EVIDENCE OF ACTUAL MALICE
THE FOLLOW-UP ARTICLE
OF JULY 2, 1988

We must look at the follow-up article of July 2,

1988,

different since by the time this article was written, there had
been obvious reasons interposed which would have given "serious
doubts" to all three defendants

as to the accuracy of the

information that appeared in the June 27, 1988, article; yet none
of the defendants made any effort to verify plaintiff's alleged
inaccuracies

of the June 27, 1988, article, other than the

insurance claim in the article.

(R. 325 #14, R. 333 #18)

This

allowed several of the same inaccuracies to reappear in the
follow-up article of July 2, 1988, with no further new investigation or collaboration.

Under these circumstances Rodney A.

Smolla in his publication LAW OF DEFAMATION, sec 3.23(3) said the
following:
When in such a republication or follow-up story no new
investigation is undertaken, despite the appearance of new
reasons for doubt, actual malice may exist with regard to
the sequel even if the first story was protected, (citations
omitted)
See also Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts, where the court held
that the defendants had actual malice and pointed out that,
"little investigative effort was expended initially, and no
additional inquires were made even after the editors were
notified by respondent and his daughter that the account, to
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be published was absolutely untrue." 388 U.S. at 169-70, 87
S.Ct. at 1999, 18 L.Ed.2d at 1119.
EVIDENCE OF ACTUAL MALICE
DEFENDANT DON HOGUN
To hold the defendant-respondent Don Hogun liable for the
defamatory inaccuracies in the follow-up article of July 2, 1988,
the plaintiff must show that the defendant had "actual malice,"
that he participated in the circumstances that led up to the
publication

of

the

article, and

that his participation was

significant enough, and was rendered with sufficient knowledge,
to make him liable for the reporter's statements.
Defendant Hogun is the Publisher and General Manager of The
Daily Spectrum, and among his responsibilities is the overseeing
of the operations of the newspaper, and is responsible for what
goes on in the newspaper, and ultimately has the authority as to
what news articles might appear or be withheld from publication,
(dep. Hogun 5 3-13 17 20-24)
The only defendant that the plaintiff communicated with
concerning the inaccuracies in the article of June 27, 1988, was
the defendant Don Hogun.
While

the

(R 349 exhibit 1 paragraph 1)

defendant,

Don

Hogun, may

be protected

from

finding actual malice in the article of June 27, 1988, by his
reliance

on the defendant Rick Guldan

and

Brent Goodey for

investigation, verification, and reviewing, and because he had
not read the article prior to its publication and had no reason
to doubt the accuracy of its contents, it is different as to the
follow-up article of July 2, 1988.
22

He cannot avoid liability

merely

by

pointing

to

the responsibilities

newspapers organizational chart.

assigned

(dep. Hogun

responsibility, again, rests with Brent Goodey")
protected

in the

69 24 "That
He is not

from liability for the printing the July 2, 1988,

article, because of his participation and involvement in the
circumstances that lead to its publication.
The defendant, Don Hogun, would be hard put not to have had
"serious doubts" about the accuracies of the June 27, and July 2,
1988, articles, after specific information of inaccuracies and
requests for an apology, correction, or retraction were given to
him personally by the plaintiff prior to the publication of the
follow-up article of July 2, 1988, (Terry West affidavit R 349
exhibit 1 #5), yet he made no effort to verify, correct, or kill
the story prior to publication,

(Don Hogun Affidavit R 325 #14)

notwithstanding the fact he possessed information that would have
certainly given him "serious doubts" as to the accuracy of the
information that was again republished.

Just the fact that the

paper found out, that the inference that the mayor had committed
insurance fraud, and the inference that the mayor was using his
office for the profit of a "friend" were false, (dep. Hogun 54
14-16) (article dated July 2, 1988

R. 349 exhibit 8), would have

alerted the defendants to other possible inaccuracies connected
to plaintiff's specific denials, and would have alerted them, to
the need for new re-examination or verification of the alleged
inaccuracies, prior to republishing the same errors. With

these

"red flags flying" a jury could easily find that Hogun's inaction
23

inferred a reckless state of mind.
The following is a list of information given Hogun

prior to

the publication of the follow-up article of July, 2, 1988, which
would have given the defendant reason to doubt the accuracies of
the statements in the June 27 article.
1. The plaintiff read his complaint letter (R 349 exhibit
6) with Don Hogun and at the same time made verbal denials
and explanations to him regarding the inaccuracies in the
June 27, 1988, article. (R 349 exhibit 1 at #5)
2.
The plaintiff told the defendant Don Hogun that he
could verify with the city manager or the city council
members as to his (Terry West's) denial of trying to push
through a conditional use permit after a regular council
meeting that would have allowed a beer licence to be issued
for a friend, fid, at #5)
3.
The plaintiff told the defendant Don Hogun that as
Mayor, he had the City of LaVerkin send out the three
letters to all the citizens of LaVerkin, setting out the
position of all the council members, including the Mayor, on
the issue of municipal power, on October 27, 1987, seven
days before the November election. He told the defendant
that the purpose of the letters were to let the voters know
what the position of all members of the city council were,
including the mayor, on the municipal power issue, and Don
Hogun said he would give these letters to Rick Guldan and
Brent Goodey and have them verify them and what I had told
him. (id. at #5)
The defendant, Don Hogun, told the plaintiff that he
would give the "reply letter" and the "letter to the citizens" to
the defendants Rick Guldan and Brent Goodey, and that he would
have them verify them and the things which the Plaintiff told
him. (id. at #5)
Notwithstanding the promise from Hogun that he would have
Rick Guldan and Brent Goodey verify the "reply letter" (R 349
exhibit 6) and the "letters to the citizens" (R 349 exhibit 7)
and the things that the Plaintiff had told him, the defendant,
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Don Hogun, failed to keep his promises, (see citation below)
With all the specific denials, showing the inaccuracies in
the June 27, 1988, article, with "red flags flying", Hogun still
allowed another article to be published without giving direction
as to how to handle any examination or re-examination of the
alleged inaccuracies of the June 27, 1988, article, (Don Hogun R
325 at #14) (see citations below) after assuring the plaintiff
that,

"I'll take care of

it."

(Terry West affidavit R 349

Exhibit 1 at #1)
The court in St. Amant v. Thompson, 390 U.S. 727, 20 L.Ed.2d
262,, 88 S.Ct
publishing

with

1323, said the following in regards to Hogun
"serious

doubts"

as

to

the

truth

of

his

publication:
(T)here must be sufficient evidence to permit the
conclusion that the defendant in fact entertained serious
doubts as to the truth of his publication; and that publishing with such doubts shows reckless disregard for truth or
falsity and demonstrates actual malice.
The following is evidence of lack of action on Hogun's part
and his failure to give direction of any kind and particularly
direction for new investigations into the truth of the statements
complained

of after he had been given reasons to doubt the

accuracy of the June 27, article and prior to the publication of
the July 2, article,

which under the circumstances is evidence

that shows reckless disregard for truth:
Q.

Did you examine or re-examine the — did you
examine or re-examine Exhibit 5 (June 27,
1988, article), in light of the demand for an
apology?
Did you examine the factual
situations in your Exhibit 5, after receiving
my denial of most of your accusations?
25

A.

No. I didn't.

Q.

Did you ask anybody to examine or re-examine
the factual statements in Exhibit 5?

A.

No.
(dep. Hogun 39 14-22)

Q.

Did you, or anyone by your direction,
investigate to see if the letter, marked
Exhibit 7, claimed by Mr. West to be sent to
all LaVerkin citizens, encouraging them to
vote for municipal power, was in fact sent?

A.

No.

Q.

You didn't ask anybody to investigate that?

A.

No.

Q.

Did you, after receiving Exhibit 6 & 7, or
someone else at your direction, re-examine
the original source for your information that
the plaintiff had changed his position
immediately after election?

A.

No.
(dep. Hogun 46 21 to 47 23)

Q.

Well, did you attempt any investigation to
verify the truth or falsity of what Mr. West
said in his letter to the editor?

A.

No.
(dep. Hogun 55 1-4)

Q.

Did you give any instructions to Mr. Goodey
concerning Exhibit 8 (July 2, article), in
light of the fact that you knew that there
was a threat of a lawsuit?

A.

No.
(dep. Hogun 66 23 to 67 10)

The following is evidence of lack of concern about truth by
Hogun after he had been given reasons to doubt the accuracy of
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the June 27, articles and prior to the publication of the July 2,
article, which under the circumstances is evidence that tends to
show reckless disregard for truth:
Q.

Were you disturbed, in June and July (1988),
when the articles, Exhibit 5 (June 27
article)and 8 (July 2, article), were being
printed about the plaintiff, by the fact or
the possibility that such bad publicity may
hurt Mayor West's credibility if not accurate?

MR. Dryer: Objection.
the question.
Q.

Argumentative, compound. You can answer

The question was, though, did it ever enter
your mind that if the statements were
inaccurate, did it ever disturb you, that it
might hurt my credibility?

Mr. Dryer: First of all, did you ever believe that at the time
of publication, that anything contained in Exhibits 6 & 8 were
inaccurate, excuse me, 5 and 8?
A.

No.
I had no reason to believe they were
inaccurate.

Q.

Okay. But I said before and after, and that
includes the time when you got a rebuttal
letter to the editor which pointed out the
inaccuracies.
And my question is, weren't
you disturbed of the possibility that they
were inaccurate and they would hurt my
credibility?

A.

No.
(dep. Hogun 9 21 to 10 22)

Q.

Okay, what he's asking you is, given the fact
that the mayor (had) brought in a letter to
you and the fact that he had threatened to
sue you, did that cause you enough concern
that you wanted to know what Rick Guldan was
going to include in his July 2nd, '88 column?

A.

That responsibility, again, rests with Brent
Goodey.
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Q.

Okay, I asked you, did you have any concern?

A.

Not enough to contact Rick.
(dep. Hogun 69 16 to 70 9)

Q.

Did it concern you when you read Mr. Guldan's
July 2nd, 1988 letter that he made no
reference to this letter that Mayor West
supposedly sent to the residents of the City
of LaVerkin?

A.

No, it did not.

Q.

Didn't you fell compelled to be totally
accurate, with the information you had in
your possession, to avoid injuring Mr. West?

A.

No.
(dep. Hogun 72 11-22)
ACTUAL MALICE
DEFENDANT BRENT GOODEY

The defendant Brent Goody admitted, that after receiving the
plaintiff's

letter

to

the

editor, which

contained

specific

denials of the inaccuracies complained of, that the "letter" made
him aware that there was a difference of opinions as to the
alleged inaccuracies.

(dep. Goodey 80 20 to 81 5)

The issue is, after the defendant Brent Goodey had read the
plaintiff's reply letter (R 349 exhibit 6)(dep. Goodey 72 1517) , and after he had been given the letter to the citizens (R
349 exhibit

#7)(dep. Hogun

62 5-12), all of which gave the

defendant reasons to have "serious doubts" as to the truth of the
alleged inaccuracies in the June 27, DID the defendant Goodey
follow his own stated polices and order further inquiry and
investigation into the statements complained of.
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His policies

referred are,
11

. . . (I)f I have reason to believe that something
might be incorrect, . . . then there would be an
attempt for more investigation . . . "
(dep. Goodey 31
5-19) and,
11

We will continue to investigate, but will only print
what can be verified. That way, when the whole mess is
sorted out, only the guilty will be 'hung'— if there
are any guilty." (dep. Goodey 26 10 to 27.8)
In defendant Goodey's Affidavit, he said:
"In reliance of the advise of Mr. Anderson, I published
plaintiff's letter to the editor and accompanying editor's
note and undertook no further action or investigation with
regard to the matter." (R 333-34 #18)
Rick Guldan testified in his answers to interrogatories on
this subject as follow,
Question 31.
Did you have any discussion with
Brent Goodey about the plaintiff's reply letter, to
your article of June 27, 1988, before publication of
your article of July 2, 1988, the one complained of in
plaintiff's second cause of action?
Answer. Yes.
Question 31 (a). Did he ask you to re-examine the
information that you used for your article of June 27,
1988, and make further investigations as to the
plaintiff's allegations that there were factual
inaccuracies in your article or any other statement to
that affect?
Answer. No.
Question 31 (b) . Did he ask you to check to see
if the letter or letters that the plaintiff alleged
were sent to the citizens of LaVerkin prior to the
election were in fact sent?
Answer. No.
Question 31 (c) . Did he ask you to make corrections of any inaccuracies you found by a follow up
article?
Answer. No.
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Question 31 (d). Did he give you any instructions
or advice or set a policy for this particular situation
as to how to proceed as to the plaintiff's complaints
that many of the statements in your article were not
true and the plaintiff's demand for an apology?
Answer. No.
Question 31 (f) .
Were there any discussions
concerning the statements the plaintiff complained of?
Answer. No.
Question 31. (g)
Who approved your article of
June 27, 1988, for publication?
Answer.

Brent Goodey.

(R 349 pages 52 to 53)
When

in

a

follow-up

story

no

new

investigation

is

undertaken, despite the appearance of new reasons for doubt,
actual malice may exist with regard to the follow-up story even
though actual malice could not be found in the first story.
Rodney A. Smolla, LAW OF DEFAMATION, sec. 3.23(3) page

3-65

(citing the following cases)
See Rinaldi v. Viking Penguin, Inc., 438 N.Y.S.2d 496 (1981);
Holder v. WLCY-TV, Inc.. 366 So.2d 445 (Fla. Dist. Ct.App. 1978);
Bindrim v. Mitchell, 92 Cal. App. 3d 61, 155 Cal Rptr. 29, cert
denied, 444 U.S. 984 (1979); Good Government Group of Seal Beach,
inc. v. Superior Court, 22 Cal. 3d 672, 150 Cal. Rptr. 258, 586
P.2d 572 (1978), cert denied sub nom. Good Government Group, Inc,
v. Hogard, 441 U.S. 961 (1979); Walker v. Colorado Springs Sun,
Inc. , 188 Colo. 86, 538 P.2d 450, cert, denied, 423 U.S. 1025
(1975; Cochran v. Indianapolis Newspaper, Inc., 175 Ind. App. 48,
372 N.E.2d 1211 (1978; Restatement (second) of Torts, Sec. 580A,
comment d at 219 (1977).
3. RELIABILITY OF SOURCES
AS EVIDENCE OF ACTUAL MALICE
The court in Holter v. WLCY T.V. Inc., 366 So.2d 445, 445
said the following:
The lesson in Gouldwater v. Ginzburg, 414 F.2d 324 (2d Cir.
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1969), Snowden v. Pearl River Broadcasting Corp,. 251 So.2d
405 (La. App.) cert, denied 259 La. 877, 253 So. 2d 217
(1971, and Mahnke v. Northwest Publications. Inc., 280 Minn.
328, 160 N.W.2d 1 (1968) is that anonymous or otherwise
suspect sources should be verified with care. Otherwise, as
noted in St. Amant. supra, recklessness may be found.
EVIDENCE OF ACTUAL MALICE
On or about March 24, 1988, the plaintiff met with the
defendant Hogun

in his office, to give him a reply letter

entitled "Irresponsible Reporting", a reply letter to The Daily
Spectrum's article of March 23, 1988, entitled "LaVerkin Residents Want Protection".

At this time, the plaintiff told the

defendant Don Hogun, that Phil Phillips, together with others in
LaVerkin, were out to discredit his honesty and integrity.

At

this same time the plaintiff discussed with the defendant Hogun
the veracity of Phil Phillips and that Rick Guldan was using Phil
Phillips as his source of information.
349 exhibit 1 as #1)

(Terry West affidavit R

The defendant Don Hogun acknowledged this

conversation during his deposition, and acknowledged that he may
have told the plaintiff's complaints to Brent Goodey.

(dep.

Hogun 20 20-25, 31 15 to 32 8)
The Defendant Goodey wrote the following about Phil Phillips
in an article dated November 20, 1988, entitled How I Came To
"Love" LaVerkin's mayor:

(see R 349 exhibit 9)

Mr. Phillips, on several occasions, has called various
people here at the Spectrum to reveal some "hot" tip about
alleged improprieties by Mayor West. He has, no doubt, been
frequently disappointed when we have not attempted to "nail"
the mayor based on unsubstantiated statements or items taken
out of context.
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Mr. Phillips, we have attempted to verify, each of your
"hot" tips about Mr. West, but many turn out to be mountains
made from molehills, so we ignore them and you think we
coddle your political enemy. (emphasis added)
Since these statements were printed five months after the June
and July articles by Defendant Guldan were printed, they are
probative

that

Goodey

entertained

serious

doubts

about

the

veracity of Phil Phillips only if it can be shown by inference,
that Goodey obtained that knowledge prior to the dates of the
articles in question.
Mr. Phillips claims that whenever he called the Spectrum to
give them information about Terry West he asked to talk to the
Defendant Rick Guldan.
2 at #6)

(Phil Phillips Affidavit R 349

Appendix

And the defendant Rick Guldan claims that he had no

conversation with Phil Phillips about the plaintiff after June
22, 1988.
according

(Rick Guldan Affidavit R 181 at #10)
to defendant

Therefore,

Rick Guldan, the "hot11 tips and the

"unsubstantiated statements or items taken out of context" had to
have occurred prior to June 22, 1988.
In Goodey,s article as quoted above he said, "Mr. Phillips,
we have attempted to verify, each of your "hot" tips about Mr.
West."

(emphases added)

The inference is, the fact that Phil

Phillips was an unreliable informant, was known by at least the
defendants Guldan and Goodey prior to the June 27, 1988, article.
Finally, it was common knowledge that Phil Phillips had a
running feud with the plaintiff.
It is not a closely guarded secret that the two (Terry West
& Phil Phillips) disagree frequently. . . . and you (Phil
Phillips) think we coddle your political enemy.
(R.349
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Appendix 9)
The Defendants relied on Phil Phillips, a known political
enemy, an informant that Goodey and Guldan had already found to
be unreliable, an informant that the plaintiff had warned Hogun
about, and under these circumstances recklessness may be found.
Likewise, recklessness may be found where there are
obvious reasons to doubt the veracity of the informant or
the accuracy of his reports. St. Amant v. Thompson, 390
U.S. at 732, 88 S.Ct. at 1326, 20 L.Ed.2d at 267-8.
The defendants lent credence to Phil Phillips' charges at a
time when they entertained doubts as to the validity of the
statements in questions and with doubts as to the reliability of
the

informant, and

yet

they

still

published,

and

it's the

publication with such doubts which shows reckless disregard for
truth or falsity and demonstrates actual malice.
The defendant cannot be held accountable unless he "in
fact entertained serious doubts as to the truth of his
publication; and that publishing with such doubts shows
reckless disregard for truth or falsity and demonstrates
actual malice." St Amant v. Thompson, 390 U.S. 727, 731, 88
S.Ct. 1323, 1325, 20 L.Ed.2d 262 (1968).
The Defendants-Appellants said the following on page 42 of
their brief:
Editor Goodey#s Knowledge That One Of Several Of
Guldan's Sources Was Biased Against the Mayor Does Not
Constitute Evidence Of Actual Malice.
Defendant Guldan was asked the following question in a set
of Interrogatories:
14.

Before publication of the article complained (of) in
plaintiffs first cause of action Dated June 27, 1988,
what inquiry or investigation did you make concerning
the statement that "Terry West, when running for mayor,
was opposed to it (municipal power)?"
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(a)

Who did you speak to about said statement?

(b)

What information did you receive from each of said
persons?

In the defendant Guldan's Answer:
that

"Phil

Phillips,

Carl

(a) and

Davis,

Kim

(b) he stated

Seegmiller,

Larry

Seegmiller, and others the exact names of whom I cannot presently
recall" told him,

"That plaintiff had told them prior to the

election that plaintiff was opposed to municipal power." (R. 339)
However, the record shows that only Phil Phillips admits making
this statement. Carl Davis, (Affidavit R. 349 Appendix 12) Kim
Seegmiller,
(Affidavit
statement.

(Affidavit R. 349 Appendix 3) and Larry Seegmiller
R.

349

Appendix

11)

all

denied

making

such

a

This leaves only Phil Phillips as the named source

for Guldan's statement that "Terry West, when running for mayor,
was opposed to it." (municipal power)

And as explained above,

defendants lent credence to Phil Phillip's charges at a time when
they

entertained

charges

and

serious

serious

doubts

doubts

as

as
to

to

the validity

the

of

reliability

those

of

the

informant.
4. DEFENDANTS MOTIVATION
AS EVIDENCE OF ACTUAL MALICE
Libel. Slander, and Related Problems, by R. Sack, at 214
(1980), said that:
Although common law actual malice—spite or ill w i l l —
is not equivalent to or sufficient to prove constitutional "actual malice", evidence as to the former is
admissible to prove the latter.
The defendant Brent Goodey wrote an article entitled, "HOW I
COME TO "LOVE" LaVERKIN#S MAYOR", on November 20, 1988.
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(R 349

exhibit 9)

After reading the article the inference is that the

defendant didn't come to "love" the plaintiff but rather came to
"hate" him.
Such a mindset, which the jury could reasonably have found,
is highly probative of whether he acted knowingly or recklessly
in authorizing the inaccuracies of the June 27, 1988 article to
be republished in the July 2, 1988, follow-up article.
The fact that all three defendants suppressed evidence from
the July 2, 1988, article is probative of ill will, and therefore
probative of "actual malice".
Deliberate slanting is further evidence of a purpose to
"get" the plaintiff and is thus probative of actual malice.
The desire to place a plaintiff in a bad (and sensational)
light is indicative of a state of mind conducive to acting
in reckless disregard of the truth.
This evidence of
motive, without more, does not prove actual malice. But it
defies logic to argue that it is not relevant. See Curtis
Publishing Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130, 169, 87 S.Ct. 1975,
18 L.Ed.2d 1094 (1967).
When the defendants did not refer to the letters that were
sent out to the citizens, which would have tended to disprove
their connotation that inferred that the plaintiff had opposed
municipal

power prior to the election to get elected, they

certainly slanted the facts which put the plaintiff in a bad
light.
Therefore, the suppression of these letters is evidence that
they were out to "get" the plaintiff and relevant as to the issue
of "actual malice."
5.

THE DEFENDANTS WERE UNDER NO TIME RESTRAINT
IN PREPARING THEIR STORY
AS EVIDENCE OF ACTUAL MALICE
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The defendants were under no time restraint in preparing
their June 27, 1988 and July 2, 1988 articles.

This was not a

fast-breaking news story; the events at issue had occurred years,
months, and weeks earlier. (Terry West affidavit R 349 exhibit 1
at 10)
the

There was no significant deadline pressure, therefore,

defendants

had

ample

time

to

search

for

collaboration.

Falsehoods uttered at leisure are more likely to be deliberate
than those published in haste.

Absence of time pressure in this

case is evidence that the jury could fairly consider.
added)

(emphasis

See Carson v. Allied News Co., 529 F.2d 206, 211 (7th

Cir. 1976) (grant of summary judgment reversed; story was not
"hot

news"

and

"defendants

were

not

bedeviled

by

an early

deadline"; Goulwater v. Ginzburg, supra, 414 F.2d at 339; R.
Sach, supra, at 215-16;.

See also Vandenbura v. Newsweek, Inc.,

507 F.2d 1024, 1026 (5thCir. 1975) ("when the story is not "hot
news," as

is the case here, the investigation must be more

thorough")
6.

REFUSAL TO APOLOGIZE, CORRECT OR RETRACT
AS EVIDENCE OF ACTUAL MALICE

Although the mere refusal

to retract

is not

sufficient

evidence, by itself, to prove actual malice. New York Times v.
Sullivan,

376 U.S. at

286, 84 S.Ct. at 727, "under certain

circumstances evidence (of a refusal by a publisher to retract a
statement after it has been demonstrated to him to be both false
and defamatory) . . . might be relevant in showing recklessness
at the time the statement was published."

Golden Bear Distribut-

ing Systems of Texas v. Chase revel. Inc., 708 F.2d 944, 950,(5th
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Cir.

1983)(quoting

Restatement

(second)

of

Torts

Sec.

580A

comment d (1977).
Concerning June article the defendants Hogun and Goodey
refused to apologize, correct, or make a retraction, on several
of the inaccurate statements, after notice that they were false
(R 349 exhibit 6), and furthermore Hogun admitted that he didn't
discuss doing so with anyone (Dep. Hogun 82 25 to 83 1-5) . The
inference is that they were not concerned about the truth or
falsity of their article, at least enough to investigate further
before publishing a follow-up article (R 349 exhibit 8)
7.

KNOWLEDGE OF THE HARM LIKELY TO FOLLOW
PUBLICATION OF THE STORY
AS EVIDENCE OF ACTUAL MALICE

Knowledge of the harm likely to follow publication of a
story is relevant to whether it was published with actual malice.
Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130, 170, 87 S.Ct. 1975,
1999, 18 L.Ed.2d 1094 (1967)(Warren, C.J.,concurring) ("knowledge
of the harm that would likely result from publication of the
article" is relevant to actual malice determination); see Mahnke
v. Northwest Publications, Inc., 280 Minn. 328, 160 N.W.2d 1, 910 (1968) ("gravity of the charges in this story was a factor to
be considered

by

the jury

in assessing the conduct of the

defendant" on the issue of "actual malice").
The articles themselves alerted

the Defendants of their

potential harm to the plaintiff's reputation, and to the fact
that no mayor or attorney can operate without credibility.
is no excuse

for implying that the plaintiff
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There

filed a false

insurance claim

or a false burglary report and that he had

opposed municipal power to get elected without proof that these
statements had been verified as to their accuracy.
8. OTHER LIBEL NOT PLEAD
AS EVIDENCE OF ACTUAL MALICE
The June 27, 1988 and July 2, 1988 articles alleged that the
plaintiff had

"tried to get a conditional use permit pushed

through after the regular meeting.

The conditional use permit

would have granted a beer license to a newly opened local garage
run by a friend of West's."

(R 349

plaintiff denied this allegation.
exhibit 1 at #9)

exhibits

5 and 8)

The

(Terry West affidavit R 349

Ron Chandler (city manager) also denied that

these statements were true.

(dep. Ron Chandler 10 19 to 13 2)

This allegation inferring that the plaintiff was using his
office

for the profit

defamatory.
Even

or advantage of another

if untrue is

(see Am Jur2d sec. 130 at 632)

though

the

trial court

found that

the statute of

limitations had run on this libel, this libel still may be used
as evidence of the actual malice of the defendants with regard to
those specific allegations that were the basis of the plaintiffs
complaint.
The court in the case Tavoulareas v. Piro, 759 F.2d at 127,
affirmed the district court's ruling that read,
Evidence of libels not specifically pleaded in the complaints are nonetheless admissible as to issues such as the
"state of mind of defendants or as to some other issue
related to those defamations pleaded specifically in the
original complaints" (emphasis added)
Tavoulareas v. Piro, 759 F2d 90, (D.C. Cir. 1985, three-judge
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panel)

was

vacated

Tavoulareas v.

by

en

Piro. 817

bano
F.2d

order

762

of

the

full

court

in

(D.C. 1987), however, this

category of "actual malice" was not rejected in the latter case.
CONCLUSION:

"ACTUAL MALICE"

In determining the issue of "actual malice", Judge Eves and
the Court of Appeals were faced with the following justifiable
inferences

derived

Hogun

Goodey's

and

from

Hogun's

involvement

and
and

Goodey's
state

of

conduct,
mind,

as

to

prior

to

publishing the July follow-up article:
1)

that Hogun7s failure to investigate further or review
the July follow-up article, after he had been given new
reasons to doubt the accuracy of the June article, was
an attempt to protect himself from suit;

2)

Goodey's allowing a follow-up article to be published
with no new investigation, despite the appearance of
new reasons for doubt the accuracies in the June
article, shows reckless disregard for truth or falsity
and demonstrates actual malice.

3)

the fact that Hogun instructed his legal counsel to
review the follow-up article infers that he had serious
doubts as to what Guldan might write given the alleged
inaccuracies in the first article;

4)

after finding that the inference that the mayor had
committed insurance fraud, and the inference that the
mayor was using his office for the profit of a "friend"
was found to be false, the inference is that these
discoveries alerted Hogun and Goodey to other possible
inaccuracies connected with the June article, and
alerted them to the need for new re-examination or
verification of the other alleged false statements,
prior to republishing them the second time;

5)

that Hogun and Goody's investigation and retraction of
the insurance story due to legal advice that it was the
only actionable statement shows a reckless disregard
for truth, the inference is that they only did what was
necessary to avoid legal action, while disregarding the
truth or falsity on the other alleged inaccuracies;

6)

that Hogun's and Goodey's failure to cause plaintiff's
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pre-election letter to the citizens to be mentioned in
the follow-up article was a deliberate attempt to avoid
any indication that the initial article was erroneous;
7)

with knowledge that the source of information for the
June article had proven to be an unreliable source in
the past, the fact that Hogun and Goodey still allowed
the publishing of the follow-up article, without new
investigation, while having reasons to doubt the
accuracy of the June article, infers their reckless
disregard for truth or falsity and demonstrates actual
malice;

8)

the fact that Hogun and Goodey was under no time
restraint in publishing the follow-up article, raises
the inference that falsehoods uttered at leisure are
more likely to be deliberate than those published in
haste;

9)

Hogun and Goodey's knowledge of the harm likely to
follow the publication of the follow-up article, after
receiving obvious reasons to doubt the accuracy of the
June article, infers their reckless disregard for truth
or falsity.

10)

that Hogun would not have consulted legal counsel after
receiving obvious reasons to doubt the accuracy of the
June article if he did not have serious doubts as to
the truth of the June article;

11)

and that Hogun would have stood by the first article
without publishing West's rebuttal letter if Hogun did
not have serious doubts as to the truth of the June
article.

Therefore, this Court should find that there was sufficient
"clear

and

convincing"

evidence,

and

justifiable

inferences

presented to Judge Eves and to the Court of Appeals on the issue
of "actual malice," hence the issue of "actual malice" of the
defendants, Don Hogun and Brent Goodey, should have been presented to the jury.
P O I N T
IV.
THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS DID NOT RELY UPON
INAPPROPRIATE EVIDENCE IN FINDING A JURY ISSUE ON ACTUAL MALICE.
First, the Defendants' investigation and retraction of only
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the statement that the plaintiff had filed a fraudulent insurance
claim

due to

legal

advice

that

it was the only actionable

statement, shows a reckless disregard for truth or falsity.

The

inference is that Defendants only did what was necessary to avoid
legal action, while disregarding the truth or falsity of the
other statements which Plaintiff
false.

alleged were defamatory and

There is no indication that the defendants discussed with

legal counsel the truth or falsity of the other statements which
the mayor claimed were also defamatory and false, nor is there
any

indication

they made

inquires

into them.

(see R. 270

Appendix "F", "G", and "H")
The Utah Court of Appeals did not hold that prepublication
consultation with legal counsel is evidence of actual malice as
the defendant and the amicus curiae SPJ claim in their briefs.
Prepublication consultation with legal counsel was not the issue
under the facts of the instant case.

The facts show that legal

counsel was sought to review the June article only after the June
article

were

printed

and

plaintiff became suspect.

after

it's

statements

about

the

(Defendants' Statement of Material

Facts #10)
Defendants reliance on the advice of legal counsel not to
investigate further the statements made in the June article is
immaterial to whether they had serious doubts as to the accuracy
of Guldan's accusations in the June article prior to published a
follow up article.

The issue is whether the fact that they did

"nothing" after receiving obvious reason to doubt the accuracy of
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the June Article before published a follow-up article, shows
reckless disregard for truth or falsity and demonstrates actual
malice.

(R. 282, 286, and 270 Appendix "H" page 5)

The Court of Appeals said the following in respect to this
issue:
Whether or not Goodey [defendants] thought that the
appropriate response would be to publish West's letter and
Guldan's response, are immaterial facts in determining
whether [they] had serious doubts as to the statements'
actual truth. Also, whether Goodey [defendants] relied on
the advice of legal counsel in deciding not to investigate
further is immaterial to the question of whether [they]
personally had serious doubts as to the accuracy of Guldan's
accusations. West, at 188.

We reject any argument that reliance upon legal counsel
somehow shields a defendant from a defamation suit.
Reliance upon legal counsel simply does not figure into the
constitutional formula created by the Supreme Court. The
proper focus is not on a defendant's efforts to avoid legal
liability.
One's reliance upon legal advice as to what
course of action should be followed to avoid legal
consequences, simply does not prevent a plaintiff from
proving that the publisher had "serious doubts" about the
statement when it was published. West, at 188 n.9.
The focus is not whether the defendants sought legal counsel
prior to publishing the follow-up article to show actual malice,
the focus of actual malice is on the defendant's attitude toward
the truth

or

falsity of the publication, on the subjective

awareness of its probable falsity, and on the actual doubts as to
it accuracy.

(not on what their attorney advised them and

whether or not their statements were actionable) See Lawrence v.
Bauer Publishing, 89 N.J. 451, 467-68 (1982)

See also Carson v.

Allied News Co., 529 F.2d 206, 209 (7th Cir. 1976)("actual malice
concentrates on the defendants' attitude toward the truth or
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falsity of the material published")
Second, in a follow-up article, when no new investigation is
undertaken by the defendants, regarding statements in the first
article which the defendants have been notified were false, and
when the only thing the defendants did, despite the appearance of
new reasons to doubt, was to print a rebuttal letter from the
plaintiff, this shows a reckless disregard for truth on the part
of the defendants.

It is not the fact that the defendants

published plaintiff's reply letter that is evidence of actual
malice, it's the fact that the only thing the paper did was to
print the plaintiff's reply letter that is evidence of actual
malice.
As the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania has noted,
" . . . an astonishing number of people are convicted
of charges they deny, and the denial does not set them right
in the public mind. A denial often leads piquancy to the
story, and printing one would be an easy escape from
liability, if that were all there was to it." Morgan v.
Bulletin Co, 369 Pa. 349, 353, 85 A.2d 869, 872 (1952). See
also Dempsey v. Time, Inc., 43 Misc.2d 754, 252 N.Y.S2d 186,
189, aff'd, 22 A.D.2d 854, 254 N.Y.S.2d 80 (1964); Cobbs v
Chicago Defender. 308 Ill.App. 55, 31 N.E.2d 323 (1941).
P O I N T
V: THE USE OF THE WORD MANIPULATE AS USED IN THE
NOVEMBER 20. 1990 ARTICLE IS DEFAMATORY UNDER UTAH LAW
Under Utah law, libel is " a malicious defamation . . .
tending

. . .

reputation

to impeach the honesty, integrity, virtue or

. . . and

contempt or ridicule."

thereby

expose him to public hatred,

Utah Code Ann. Sec. 45-2-2 (1975).

No

general rule can be laid down defining what words are, and what
words are not, defamatory, but each case should be decided on its
own facts. 50 Am Jur2d 521 Sec. 8.
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Looking at the actual

statements complained as set forth in the third cause of action,
and when read in the context of the entire November 20, 1988
column, the statements are defamatory in that they do tend to
"impeach the honesty, integrity, . . . or reputation" of the
plaintiff and do tend to bring him into "public hatred, contempt
or ridicule."
The

statements

complained

of,

as

printed

in

the

defendants7 newspaper on November 20, 1988, said the following:
How I Came to #Love# LaVerkin's Mayor. . . The problem I
have with the two gentlemen is their repeated, and not too
subtle, attempts to manipulate the press." . . .
"Mr. Phillips, on several occasions, has called
various people here at the Spectrum to reveal some "hot" tip
about alleged improprieties by Mayor West.
He has, no
doubt, been frequently disappointed when we have not
attempted to "nail" the mayor based on unsubstantiated
statements or items taken out of context . . .
You should know, Mr. West, your allegations that Mr.
Phillips cleverly manipulates news coverage are without
merit.
It isn't that he hasn't tried. He, like you Mr.
West, has tried, to convince us that his gospel is the true
gospel. . ." (R 349 exhibit 9) (appendix C) (emphases added)
Note: The statements complained of must be read in the context
of the entire column as required by law. Cramer v. Seattle PostIntelligence, 723 P.2d 1195 (Wash. App 1986)(in determining
whether publication is defamatory, article must be read as a
whole and not in parts detached from main body); Burns v. McGrawHill Broadcasting Co.. Inc.. 659 P.2d 1351, 1360 (Colo. 1983) (in
determining whether statement is defamatory, the "entire
published statement must be examined in context, not just the
objectionable word or phrase")
This

article,

Phillips of

after

accusing

both Terry

West

and

Phil

repeated, and not to subtle, attempts to manipulate

the press, it then said that Terry West like Mr. Phillips has
tried to cleverly manipulate news coverage.

These accusations

are made about Mr. Phillips supported by detailed facts, all of
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which are very defamatory

if false under Utah law, and the

detailed facts supporting the accusations about the plaintiff are
missing.

This leaves the imagination of the readers to run wild,

wondering what the plaintiff did repeatedly to manipulate the
press, if it wasn't the same things that the article accused Mr.
Phillips of doing.
The article, when read
defamatory

connotations

in its entirety, gives negative

about the plaintiff, while the truth

about the plaintiff is admitted by the defendant, Don Hogun, in
his deposition.
MR. WEST: And what I'm saying, isn't it true that
the only thing I've asked (you) to do is to use care
and diligence in ascertaining the truth before you
print rumors, unfounded allegations and lies?
I've
asked it in letters, I've asked it personally, orally.
Isn't that true, that's all I've asked you to do?
THE WITNESS: (Don Hogun)
doing.

That's what I thought we were

(By Mr. West) Isn't it true that's all I've asked you
to do?
ANSWER:

Yes.

(dep. Don Hogun 90 1-11)
The

New

Webster

Encyclopedic

Dictionary

defines

"Manipulate" as - n. The act of operating upon skillfully, for
the purpose of giving a false appearance.

(R 79) (appendix D)

This definition describes what the article claims Mr Phillips had
done.
There is no question, that under this definition, to be
accused of "repeated attempts to manipulate the press", would
impeach a mayor's, or an Attorney's honesty and integrity and
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would expose the plaintiff to public hatred, contempt or ridicule.
At the trial level, the jury in A. E. Hotchner, 551 F.2d
910, 912 (1977) (second circuit), found the characterization of
the plaintiff as a "manipulator" libelous, but on appeal the
second circuit court did not make a holding on this issue since
they decided this case on other grounds.
The

Plaintiff's

Third

Cause

of

Action

should

not

be

dismissed for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be
granted

because

the

statement

complained

of

is

reasonably

susceptible of a defamatory meaning under Utah law.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons expressed above the Utah Court of Appeal's
decision in the West case should be affirmed.
DATED this £7'

day of January, 1993.

Tdrry^west Pla/ntiff-Appellee
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